This paper investigates the power of -walls‖ to constrain thought and silence diverse voices of reason within planning. Using die Mauer (The Berlin Wall) as a linking metaphor, this paper juxtaposes mid-1950s planning in a spatially-and ideologically-
Introduction
In Berlin there used to be a wall. For thirty years that wall, die Mauer, physically divided Berlin into East and West. For obvious reasons, that physical division powerfully affected planning in the city. But die Mauer also stood as a powerful symbol of the divide 2 between -the free world‖ of the West and -the evil empire‖ of the East. In most U. S. cities, there also used to be a wall. It was a powerful social divide that separated blacks from whites. I will argue in this paper that these two walls-the Cold War wall between East and West and the race-related wall between blacks and whites-were linked in a way that radically constrained planning thought and action. 1 To do this, I will contrast mid-1950s planning in Berlin with planning conducted by Harland Bartholomew and Associates (Bartholomew) in Louisville, Kentucky, and then set Bartholomew's plan against a mid-1950s narrative about efforts to desegregate housing in Louisville. These juxtapositions will lead me to conclude that Bartholomew's ostensibly apolitical technical approach to planning reinforced the wall separating blacks from whites in Louisville by focusing far too narrowly on physical planning, by not discussing the extent to which black presence and -white flight‖ contributed to the suburbanization of Louisville's population, and by woefully understating the extent to which suburban whites would use their political power to block Louisville's ability to annex land in its suburbanizing periphery. By being silent about the race-related context of his practice, by complacently planning as if the city's segregated way of life was normal, and by not analyzing strategies explicitly designed to improve the quality of life among Louisville's African-American population, Bartholomew helped to construct and maintain Louisville's race-related wall and thereby inhibited his ability to plan coherently for the city-region of Louisville as a whole.
Taken by itself, this claim is not especially new or noteworthy. But the contrasts also lead me to claim that Bartholomew's planning for Louisville in the 1950s was implicitly affected by Cold War-era efforts to repress any transformations that could be Moreover, the meaning of a wall is not an objective fact, independent of interpretation. Rather, its meaning depends on the narrative context (i. e., story) in which it is set (Throgmorton, 2003) . One key story is the designer's. Guided by it, planners seek to shape the physical design and form of city-regions, which might include constructing physical walls of various kinds. The construction of such walls then affects the stories that can be told and to whom they can be told. But diverse users of city-regions are guided by stories that differ from the planners', and hence often interpret the meaning of any given wall in ways that differ from the designer's. Consequently, insofar as multiple and contestable stories can be told about city-regions, a wall can act as a flexible trope (persuasive figure of speech or argument). In brief, stories construct walls, but walls construct stories.
With this understanding in mind, let us now turn to one of the hardest of all intentional walls, die Berliner Mauer.
Planning for a Divided Post-War City: Berlin in the Mid-1950s
In May 1945 Berlin lay in ruins, its buildings reduced to shells.
2 It was, Berliners said, Stunde Null (-Zero Hour‖), the hour at which the old Nazi order ended and a new world began, and time for der Kahlschlag (a clean sweep or total clearance). Berlin was soon divided into four zones of occupation, with the largest (the Russian) being on the east and the other three being on the west. Gradually the division hardened. In 1948 the Soviet Union imposed a blockade around Berlin, and the West responded by airlifting food and other supplies into Berlin. The blockade was lifted 18 months later, but in May, 1952, the East German government barricaded its border with West Germany. One year later, on June 17, 1953, workers in East Berlin rose in rebellion against their Soviet overseers. Defining it as a Western-inspired counterrevolution, the Soviet and East
German regimes quickly crushed the rebellion, killing 21 people in East Berlin alone (Large, 2000, p. 431) . Berlin became a critical -flashpoint‖ in the emerging -Cold War‖ between the two post-war -Superpowers,‖ a political symbol of the conflict between the . As the years passed, the East German government fortified the Wall with a security zone (or -death strip‖) accessible only to guards and marked by searches, patrols, observation, and identification checks at the few official crossing points. One could pass through the Wall only at considerable risk, with the risk all-too-frequently resulting in death: at least 78 people, plus an unknown number of East German border guards, died in confrontations at the Wall over its 28 year existence (Ladd, p. 24) . Gradually, however, people on both sides became used to the Wall, treating it as an almost normal background to their day-to-day lives.
Almost normal. As time passed, the western side of the Wall began to flourish as a mural for colorful graffiti. Many of the graffiti artists tried to disrupt the solidity and continuity of the Wall's thisness by suggesting the existence of openings in it or the processes of breaking through it. Symbolizing both unity and division, die Mauer acted as a -zipper‖ that simultaneously linked and divided Berliners (Ladd, 1997 (Bartholomew, 1957, p. 1) . Of particular importance to Bartholomew in 1957 was that it had been, in 1930, -impossible to foresee the tremendous volumes of automobiles and trucks which the streets would some day be required to carry‖ (p. 5). Moreover, legislative authority and methods had not been available in 1930 to solve -the problems of slums and blight‖ (p. 5). In the light of these changing needs and conditions, the 1957 plan sought to provide -a guide‖ for -the orderly and economic future growth of the urban area‖ (p. 2) over the next 25 years.
- Despite recognizing, accepting, and preparing for further suburbanization, Bartholomew's plan anticipated that the central business district (CBD) would continue to meet the commercial and office needs of the city and adjoining trade territories.
Although other commercial areas were developing in the suburbs, they would remain subordinate to the CBD. Housing also received a significant amount of attention in Bartholomew's plan.
The plan clearly recognized that national polices affected residential growth, especially policies pertaining to public housing, slum clearance, urban renewal, and the subsidization of new home construction. It argued that in order to attack -the problem of housing‖ it would be -necessary to protect the areas that contain standard or good housing, rehabilitate and improve blighted areas, and rebuild obsolete areas‖ (pp. 81-82).
Importantly, the task of rebuilding -obsolete‖ areas would focus primarily on areas that were part of the historical city as it existed prior to 1925. Bartholomew noted, indeed celebrated, the fact that several urban redevelopment and renewal areas were already underway. 7 Although Bartholomew drew no attention to it, one of them, the West Downtown renewal project, would demolish the old Walnut Street district, which was the main cultural and entertainment district serving African-Americans.
One can, 45 years after it was written, find many technical flaws in Bartholomew's plan. One can, for example, point to its reliance on trend extrapolation for forecasting Louisville's future population and its failure to foresee factors that would dramatically alter the city's growth. Just as the 1929-31 plan had failed to foresee the tremendous increases in traffic that would be coming over the next 20 years, so too the 1957 plan failed to foresee the extent to which construction of its recommended expressways would dramatically accelerate the dispersion and decentralization of residential, commercial, and industrial development. Moreover, the plan did not foresee the possibility that excessive reliance on imported oil would provoke an oil embargo and precipitate deindustrialization of the region's economy. As a consequence of these and other unanticipated trends and events, Louisville's population actually declined to 298,451 persons in 1980 rather than increasing to 662,000 residents as projected. One could also point to its presumption that Louisville lay -in the path‖ of the westward and southward movement of the nation's population and industry and to its assumption that emitting more chemicals into the ambient environment would be good for the people of This happened several times, whenever they rode that way. There was always an excuse, always the promise of maybe someday. The park took on even more fascination because it was out of reach. Finally one day, evidently realizing he could no longer make excuses, Andrew's father told him the truth.
-Son, I can't take you there,‖ he said. Andrew recalls that his father seemed to be chagrined, almost guilty as he spoke. -That park is for white people. We're colored people. There are some places colored people are not allowed to go.‖ Andrew was stunned. A door had slammed in his face, the first of many slamming doors that he and every Negro child encounters.
Forbidden parks, forbidden buildings, forbidden movies, forbidden restaurants…a hemmed-in world -a wall around your life‖ (p. 8).
Wade had to find a gate through the wall and people on the other side to meet him. 13 Most job opportunities were closed to Negroes, Louisville's schools were segregated, its park system was divided white and Negro, most of its private hospitals refused to admit Negroes, and most public places in the city were -behind the color bar‖ (p. 41). Braden recognized that many cracks had appeared in the wall between 1947 and 1954, but in her view these advances toward desegregation -affected only a few people-and didn't affect them much.…To most of Louisville's people in 1954, segregation was a way of life that one did not question‖ (pp. 45-46).
The house that the Bradens bought was located in an area that used to be farmland but had by 1954 been quickly filling up with new houses. The Bradens bought the house and then sold it to the Wades because they believed that was the only way to break down the wall of segregated housing. The sale immediately produced panic among the neighbors. That panic led to a series of actions over the next few days and weeks. A hostile crowd gathered outside the house, someone threw a rock with a threatening message through a window, someone fired rifle shots into the house, a group of men set fire to a cross in an adjoining field, and someone destroyed half the house with a dynamite charge. 14 More important, perhaps, it also led-especially after the house was dynamited early on June 27-to claims that the purchase represented a Communistinspired effort to, as the editor of a local suburban newspaper, put it, -encourage panic, chaos, and riot to lower the morale of the American people‖ (p. 89). In part this panic stemmed from a belief that people are happier and better off if they live among their own kind. It also stemmed from fear that the presence of Negroes would cause the value of white-owned property to drop. In Braden's view, these beliefs were myths propagated in part by banking and real estate men. These were -not evil men‖ in her view. They were -trapped men‖ who had learned that a segregated housing pattern is the best for all concerned -as they learned their ABC's; they had absorbed it in the air they breathed.…And so when the time came to act on it, they acted-convinced, or nearly so, that the values they accepted were eternal ones‖ (p. 115). It was a situation we inflicted upon ourselves when we built the wall-or when our ancestors built it.…We put a whole race of people away from us and behind a wall; no white man should be shocked if these [Negro] people do not now accept at face value his statements about his desire ultimately to crumble the wall.…White humanity has not earned the trust of the black man.
I think that trust can be established across the wall.…But it is white men who built the wall, and it is they who must take the initiative if the trust is to be established (pp. 300-301).
Where the Wall Was Then
A wall divided Berlin. A wall also divided Louisville. The wall in Berlin, later symbolized by die Mauer, was a Cold War divide separating West from East. In
Louisville the wall was simultaneously a racial divide that separated whites from blacks and a political/cultural divide that separated expert planners from the public for which they planned. In both cases, the wall marked a sharp polarization, an either/or divide which one could cross only at great peril. And yet in Louisville as in 1957 Berlin, expert planners planned as if the city was one, whole, undivided. They sought to obliterate differences in the interest of a unified city vision which, while allegedly shunning politics, actually reflected and reproduced the polarized politics of the Cold War divide.
In Louisville, the polarized politics of West versus East combined with Bartholomew's apolitical conception of planning to maintain and reinforce Louisville's racial divide and to, as Anne Braden put it, make it -almost impossible for a voice of reason to be heard.‖ Much like the closed circle of planners that Klaus Kunzmann (2001) refers to in a recent article about contemporary planning in Germany, Bartholomew believed that -well reasoned planning considerations‖ focused exclusively on physical development-that is, technical expertise-should supplant -expediency‖ or the desires of -special interest groups.‖ But Bartholomew understood that -intelligent execution of the planning program‖ meant that a few key appointed and elected officials (and the businessmen allied with them) would have to adopt the plan and associated ordinances. Persuading that narrow audience meant deferring to its assumptions about what was politically desirable and feasible. 15 In part that meant devising a -city practical‖ (Foglesong, 1986) (Lovelace, 1992) to draw attention to the existence and adverse consequences of Louisville's racial wall.
Rather than dwell on a historical hypothetical that can never really be answered, I
prefer to bring the question to the present. In Berlin, now that die Mauer has fallen, and -[w] hile the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting premptively against such terrorists‖ (p. 6). (Kifner, 2002) , tend to reinforce the notion that -the Other‖ is a threat who can and must be kept out (Bollens, 2002) . By presuming that -the Other‖ has a uniform identity, such walls deepen fear and distrust, obliterate other differences, silence other voices. Moreover, as die Mauer demonstrates, they almost always fail in the long run. In the present context, it is particularly important to note that, despite the aggressive effort to establish a permanent and impermeable barrier between Good and Evil, there are many good reasons to believe that the actual wall currently being built will be highly transparent, highly porous, and highly mutable, even if closely monitored. Economic globalization, global communication systems, transnational migrations, complex environmental flows and cycles, and exurbanization of development in the regions of "the North" combine to create a parallel context that transgresses, undermines, and reshapes the wall being constructed by the -war against terrorists.‖ Similarly, those trends and processes undermine and transgress the conventional technical, political, and epistemological boundaries that underpin planners' work.
This leads me to conclude that the wisest course for contemporary planners is, first, to look for -islands of difference‖ behind each side of the wall, and, second, to create public spaces and transitional zones that enable safe and generative social interaction between people on opposite sides of the wall. The first approach would recognize that each side contains a -plurality of identities‖ which cut across and work against the primary identities that the wall seeks to create (Sen, 2001) . It would have us look carefully at the common history of both sides of the wall, treating their shared underworld space as a realm that fosters creativity and imagination and which houses memories, fears, and aspirations (Caldwell, 2002) . It would have us listen carefully, as
Peter Schneider does in his Berlin novel Der Mauerspringer (-The Wall Jumper‖), to the stories of people who migrate from one side of a wall to the other.
The second would have us try to open new passages through those walls or improve the quality of existing gateways, bridges, sites of transition, and shared experiences, and thereby make space for diverse voices of reason to be heard. In the present context, this would mean helping diverse publics identify and understand their fears, helping them understand one another better, helping them engage in fruitful dialogue, and helping them build trust in one another. To do this in the context of a -war against terrorists,‖ planners will have to construct themselves, not as Bartholomewian apolitical technical experts, but as -skilled-voices‖ (Throgmorton, 2000) who make physical and narrative space for the actual diverse people of U. S. cities to engage in fruitful dialogue with their fellow strangers (Eckstein and Throgmorton, 2003) . As Jim
Wallis puts it in The Soul of Politics (pp. 162-163):
In America we build walls we desperately hope will keep people away from us. But these same walls are ultimately unable to prevent us from experiencing the consequences of abandoning our neighbor. The walls divide us but they don't protect us. Those illusory but oppressive walls must be broken down and nothing does that better than the experience of listening directly to the people on the other side of the wall. Balfour (1990) , Ladd (1997) , Large (2000) , Richie (1998), and Strom (2001) . 8 I do not mean to suggest that Bartholomew's plan created the race-related wall in
Louisville. As Wright (1985) amply documents, many of the city's institutions were legally segregated until the early 1950s, and a form of -polite racism‖ had long marked the attitude of the city's white elite toward blacks. But Louisville was never as strictly segregated as other parts of the South and blacks had, unlike in other parts of the South, retained the right to vote. Moreover, as Kleber (2001) documents, the structure of legal segregation had begun collapsing after WW II.
